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ABSTRACT: Archivists are uniquely situated to problematize the use and misuse of 
records in a legal context. But along with the ability to think critically about how records 
are discussed and employed, archivists have a responsibility to act when records are being 
used as tools of oppression. This paper serves a dual purpose. First, it contributes to the 
field of Critical Archival Studies with original analysis and theory around records in legal 
discourse. It rethinks the 2018 US Supreme Court case Carpenter v. United States through 
critical examination of four archival frameworks: co-creation and third-party doctrine; the 
use of documents to control the movements of certain bodies; privacy in record-keeping; 
and the assumed neutrality of information infrastructure. Second, it moves beyond specific
analysis of the particular case, which has already been decided, to provide other archivists 
with a conceptual and practical roadmap to problematize the status quo usage of records in
a legal context. Archivists’ increasingly nuanced conceptions of records and 
documentation are not cited as technical background or evidence in Supreme Court cases. 
Active introduction and application of these new theories to the legal field would disrupt 
broader societal conceptions of records in daily life, expose racism in legal invocations of 
records and record-keeping, and ultimately serve an emancipatory function. The paper 
ends with an appeal to archivists to intervene in the dominant narrative around records in 
legal discourse.
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In 2017, Caswell, Punzalan, and Sangwand named Critical Archival Studies (CAS), which 
they defined broadly as an approach of exploring and explaining the injustice of current 
archival practice and research and offering practical steps toward change. The ultimate goal 
of this field is emancipation, a transformational framework and reality for both the archival 
field and society more broadly (Caswell, Punzalan, and Sangwand 2017, 2–3). CAS is a call 
to action to examine power in record creation, keeping, and outreach. By breaking down 
what is taken for granted in this field, archivists might build a new archival practice that is 
liberating rather than oppressive. 
Naming CAS was a crucial step in identifying a lineage of extant and forthcoming 
scholarship that interrogates, rethinks, and reframes archival concepts in critical ways; the 
act of naming was a formal recognition of scholarship that interrogated dominant archival 
concepts prior to 2017 and a call to action for archivists to continue doing this work. 
Though first named to promote CAS as an intervention in the humanities, challenging the 
subordinated position of archival studies within that field and the subordinating 
implications of fundamental assumptions about the scope and nature of records, CAS has 
been used as a framework through which to advocate for forcibly displaced populations; 
orphaned children; victims and survivors of racialized police violence; and others who have
been traditionally pushed to the margins of archival theory, practice, and advocacy 
(Caswell, Punzalan, and Sangwand 2017, 4–5). 
Archivists are uniquely situated to problematize the use and misuse of records in a legal 
context. But along with the ability to think critically about how records are discussed and 
employed, archivists have a responsibility to act when records are being used as tools of 
oppression. In this paper, I show that we have archival concepts to problematize the use of 
records in legal cases and that we have the power to apply and introduce these concepts 
through amicus briefs1 and other methods. But we are not using these tools, which has 
material effects on the lives of people within and affected by the US legal system. 
This paper serves a dual purpose. First, it contributes to the field of CAS with original 
analysis and theory around records in legal discourse. It rethinks the US Supreme Court 
case Carpenter v. United States through critical examination of four archival frameworks: 
co-creation and third-party doctrine; the use of documents to control the movements of 
certain bodies; privacy in record-keeping; and the assumed neutrality of information 
infrastructure.
1 Legal documents that come from non-litigant private individuals, state governments, nonprofits, tech 
companies, and other interested parties to advise courts on relevant, additional information about a case.
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Second, it moves beyond specific analysis of the particular case (which has already been 
decided) to provide other archivists with a conceptual and practical roadmap to 
problematize the status quo usage of records in a legal context. Archivists’ increasingly 
nuanced conceptions of records and documentation are not cited as technical background 
or evidence in Supreme Court cases. Active introduction and application of these new 
theories to the legal field would disrupt broader societal conceptions of records in daily life,
expose racism in legal invocations of records and record-keeping, and ultimately serve a 
material emancipatory function.
Analyzing the body of work created around the case through amicus briefs and Justices’ 
opinions, I use Carpenter v. United States as a salient example of how to critically activate 
archival theories to think about the kinds of records examined and discourses employed in 
US legal contexts. First, I outline the records context of this case, and trace the lineage of 
racialized surveillance and property-based arguments which ground this case uniquely and 
squarely in a colonial American culture. Next, I read this case through the lens of CAS and 
offer challenges to dominant theoretical formations of the archival profession that reiterate 
the practices which underlie this case and others in its lineage. I conclude with a discussion 
of how these theories can and must inform broader societal conceptions of records and 
record-keeping to create a more just future, and I call on archivists to reflexively examine 
our practices, theories, and advocacy to confront the powerful racism of the status quo.
Carpenter v. United States
In April of 2011, four men were arrested in connection with numerous armed robberies of 
smartphones2 at RadioShack and T-Mobile stores in Ohio and Michigan. One of those men 
turned his phone over to the police. Looking through his call records, the police identified 
sixteen additional suspects, including Timothy Carpenter. The officers then requested that 
cell service providers make available the suspects’ cell-site location information (CSLI), data
that is generated whenever a smartphone connects to the closest cell tower. From looking at 
127 days of Carpenter’s CSLI, the police determined that Carpenter’s phone was in the 
vicinity of four of the robberies, and by extension and inference, that Carpenter was also 
present. Carpenter was sentenced to 116 years in federal prison for the robberies. 
2 “Smartphone” in this paper will be used to refer to mobile phones which have computing capability and 
connectivity to cellular data networks. “Smartphone” is used intentionally rather than the broader term 
“cellphone,” as a smartphone has abilities and purposes beyond calling and sending text messages
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In mid-2017, the case went to the Supreme Court of the United States, with the question of
“Whether the warrantless seizure and search of historical cell phone records revealing the 
location and movements of a cell phone user over the course of 127 days is permitted by 
the Fourth Amendment”3 (Legal Information Institute 2017). Carpenter’s lawyers argued 
that the warrantless search and seizure of his smartphone records constituted a Fourth 
Amendment violation, while the Government contended that no warrant was needed 
because information about smartphone users’ locations and movements are not private. 
Oral arguments were heard in November 2017, and a decision was handed down in June 
2018 in Carpenter’s favor. 
The creation, movement, storage, and analysis of CSLI are presented in the case by the 
Respondent and the Respondent’s supporters as neutral, objective processes that are 
completely out of the hands of smartphone users. CSLI is packaged as public, non-content 
metadata which is produced when private information moves through communications 
infrastructure. However, framing the argument in this way also implies that the 
infrastructure of information networks is unbiased and equitable. In reality, the use of 
metadata can have material implications on people’s lives. Ruling in favor of the 
Government and allowing CSLI to be legally considered non-content metadata and thus not 
protected by the Fourth Amendment would have sanctioned and reiterated practices of 
surveillance of those who statistically disproportionately rely on cellular data: young people
of color with low incomes and low levels of educational attainment.
The monitoring of CSLI, and the political and societal schema which allow that monitoring, 
are part of a lineage of racialized surveillance of the movements of Black bodies. Further, 
the limited conceptual discussion around records and record-keeping and the limited range 
of voices present in the court records reflect archival professionals’ failure to imagine and 
advocate for new records and record-keeping frameworks that account for anti-racist views 
of creatorship, ownership, and use of records.
A Racialized Lineage
After hearing Carpenter v. United States, Justice Roberts’s majority opinion urges the 
government to be ahead of new technologies and their use in surveillance practices. Even 
3 The Fourth Amendment of the US Constitution is “The right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no 
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly 
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”
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while supporting Carpenter, what Justice Roberts misses is that in order to truly understand 
what brought the case to the Supreme Court, we must look not to future, but to the past.
In Dark Matters: On the Surveillance of Blackness, Simone Browne traces the lineage of 
racialized surveillance from slave ships and slave passes, runaway laws, and other forms of 
codifying spatial allowances for enslaved people to modern surveillance practices. In doing 
so, she disrupts the narrowness of and the privileging of whiteness in the field of 
surveillance studies (Browne 2015, 11). For decades, African-American communities and 
leaders have been targeted in surveillance programs by local and federal law enforcement 
agencies, and new technologies have only heightened the ubiquity of surveillance (Kayyali 
2014; Kift 2016).
Surveillance is not a single action, but a cultural practice which is embedded in, the product
of, and the producer of social norms (Monahan 2011, 495). As a cultural practice 
predicated on social sorting, it amplifies social inequalities (Monahan 2011, 498). It is, as 
John Fiske (1998, 71) says, “a perfect technology for non-racist racism,” which Fiske 
defines as racism encoded into race-neutral or even anti-racist discourses which have 
racially differentiated effects. Surveillance is so effective as a technique because it is tucked
within a discourse of protective beneficence which obscures its repressive effects.
Surveillance is neither equalizing nor equally applied, nor are its effects equally challenged 
by anti-surveillance advocates. Though it is racialized, the very process of surveillance 
being an exertion of power (Fiske 1998, 85–86), race is subordinated in a surveillance 
discourse dominated by a white mainstream, which remains relatively untouched by 
surveillance’s deep societal penetration (Beutin 2017, 7). Numerous leading tech 
companies, including Google, Apple, Nest, and Airbnb, filed a joint, neutral amicus brief in
Carpenter v. United States. All of these companies are rolling out so-called smart home 
technology––networked electronics within a home that can turn on lights, lower blinds, and 
restock a refrigerator. Their limited argument is that data privacy is imperative because 
people will be more comfortable with pervasive, individualized, in-home technologies like 
smart thermometers and automatic pet feeders if they do not feel they are being watched. 
In the end, they are only advocating for protections for a privileged, segmented class of 
users.
Though internet access is essential to contemporary life and smartphone ownership is 
distributed roughly equally, the way people access the internet is not equal across 
demographics. People living in poverty and people without stable living or employment 
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situations are more likely to access the internet through smartphones, without an in-home 
or workplace wired broadband connection (Hofmann, Albert, and Selbst 2017, 34). The 
percentage of American adults who own smartphones with cellular data but do not use 
broadband at home is highly segmented by age (17 percent of adults eighteen to twenty-
nine versus 7 percent of adults over sixty-five), race (9 percent, 15 percent, and 23 percent 
for White, Black, and Hispanic adults, respectively), income (21 percent of those earning 
less than $30,000 versus just 5 percent for those earning over $75,000), and education (27 
percent of adults with less than a high school degree versus just 5 percent of college 
graduates) (Pew Research Center 2017). These disparities show up in real-world uses of 
smartphones. For example, 38 percent of African-American job-seekers searched for 
employment primarily using their smartphones, compared with 24 percent of white job-
seekers (Hofmann, Albert, and Selbst 2017, 35). Despite these statistics, data privacy 
discussions at the highest levels do not express concern for these communities with 
intersectional marginalized identities.
The infrastructure of communication is not neutral, nor are the records produced through its 
use. Any surveillance practice relying primarily on CSLI, therefore, has “disparate effects on
different populations” (Hofmann, Albert, and Selbst 2017, 35) and is a textbook case of 
Fiske’s non-racist racism. Lest we think settling Carpenter v. United States closed this 
practice, as Judge Alex Kozinski noted in United States v. Pineda-Moreno (2010),4 so many 
law enforcement agencies are requesting CSLI that cell providers have developed self-
service websites for retrieving user data. The numbers are so high that “we can safely say 
that ‘such dragnet-type law enforcement practices’ are already in use” (Willen et al. 2017, 
12), and the decision will not end those practices.
Critically Activating Archival Theory
Co-creation and third-party doctrine
As Justice Roberts states in his majority opinion, opposition to unfettered British rummaging
of property and places during “the colonial era” (Supreme Court of the United States 2018, 
4) was the first act of resistance in what would become the Revolutionary War. However, it 
was only in 1992 that the Fourth Amendment was clarified to cover people––not just 
property and places––and the discomfort with that recent expansion is apparent in other 
Justices’ writings. In his dissent, Justice Kennedy calls it “unprincipled and unworkable” to 
4 In this case, the Supreme Court decided placing a GPS tracking device on a suspect’s personal vehicle 
violates the Fourth Amendment.
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“unhinge Fourth Amendment doctrine from the property-based concepts that have long 
grounded the analytic framework that pertains in these cases” (Supreme Court of the United 
States 2018, 3) and claims that “This case should be resolved by interpreting accepted 
property principles as the baseline for reasonable expectations of privacy” (Supreme Court 
of the United States 2018, 22). What both justices miss, in different ways, is the specifically 
racist roots of property-based constitutional arguments, and that “accepted” principles and 
protections are differentially applied and ontologically understood.
Critical Race Theory is a movement born of Critical Legal Studies that examines “the very 
foundations of the liberal order, including equality theory, legal reasoning, Enlightenment 
rationalism, and neutral principles of constitutional law” (Delgado and Stefancic 2012, 64). 
By looking deeply into property protection’s racist roots, it is clear that property law is a 
colonial instrument which sets up “the conditions for colonial conquest, domination, and 
control” (Anderson 2015, 770). Justice Kennedy shudders at “The Court’s multifactor 
analysis—considering intimacy, comprehensiveness, expense, retrospectivity, and 
voluntariness—[which] puts the law on a new and unstable foundation” (Supreme Court for 
the United States 2018, 21). Western jurisprudence is based firmly on individual property 
rights and the very notion of a Western rule of law is thrown into question when property 
rights are perceived as being challenged.
The privileging of a dominant Western jurisprudence based on property rights over a 
justice system based on comprehensiveness and voluntariness explains the legal precedents 
which predated Carpenter v. United States. “Third-party doctrine” is the policy established 
by Katz v. United States (1967)5 and reaffirmed in United States v. Miller (1976)6 and Smith 
v. Maryland (1979)7 that a person who turns information over voluntarily to a third party 
has no reasonable legal expectation of privacy to that information. When someone tells her 
friend a secret, she may hope that her friend relays that secret to no one else, but she has no
legal recourse if the friend then does tell someone else the secret. This doctrine is most 
often called upon in relation to business records. The Government argues that under the 
third-party doctrine, smartphone users who have signed contracts with cell service 
5 In this case, the Supreme Court decided that police are required to obtain a search warrant to wiretap a 
public payphone, and that physical intrusion is not necessary to invoke the Fourth Amendment.
6 In this case, the Supreme Court decided that people have no right to privacy in bank records, which are 
considered business records belonging to the bank and not private papers.
7 In this case, the Supreme Court decided that there is no illegal search of “pen registers” owned by phone
companies, as phone numbers are given over by consumers in the regular course of business. In the 
dissent, Justice Thurgood Marshall argued that because there is no practical alternative to dialing phone 
numbers through a phone company, this intrusion could impede free speech and political affiliation.
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